A Lie Did Not Open Ceuta’s Border on Its Own

Tens of thousands of people crossed the border between Morocco and the Spanish city of Ceuta after false information spread across social media. But a digital campaign can mobilise people; it cannot, on its own, remove security from one of Europe’s most heavily controlled borders. Morocco had the means, the opportunity and a clear political motive. At the same time, there are documented American and Israeli interests in supporting Morocco’s claims to Ceuta and Melilla. This warrants serious scepticism, but it does not yet justify claiming that the three countries conducted a joint operation.

Tens of thousands crossed the border

On 30 and 31 July 2026, tens of thousands of people entered Ceuta, the Spanish city on the North African coast, from Morocco.

The figures remain uncertain. Spanish authorities initially estimated that approximately 50,000 people had entered. Morocco reported 40,000, while Spain subsequently registered around 69,500 returns to Moroccan territory. These discrepancies show that no definitive and consistent count is yet available.

The Spanish government’s official count recorded 72 deaths on the Spanish side. Morocco reported another 11 deaths, bringing the confirmed total to at least 83. Local authorities in Ceuta have reported more bodies, although Reuters noted that some may have come from earlier migration attempts. It is therefore not yet possible to establish a final death toll. Reuters has compiled the preliminary figures and the authorities’ explanations.

The court ruling that became an open border

One significant trigger was the spread of false messages claiming that Ceuta’s border was open and that people entering by sea would automatically be allowed to remain in Spain.

The messages were based on a genuine ruling by the Spanish Supreme Court. The ruling was issued on 29 June and announced publicly on 8 July. It held that the procedure for immediate return at the border could not be applied in the same way to people intercepted while swimming around the physical border installations.

The ruling did not open the border. Nor did it grant a general right of residence or allow unrestricted travel to mainland Spain. It clarified the procedures Spanish authorities must follow in a specific situation. This is stated in the Supreme Court’s own account of the ruling.

On social media, however, that legal distinction was transformed into a much simpler message: the border was open and people could enter without documents.

A large-scale digital mobilisation

Spanish security analyst Chema Gil produced an approximately 70-page open-source intelligence analysis of social media activity preceding the mass crossing.

According to the analysis, videos, routes, times, transport information and updates about conditions at the border were circulated through TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, X and WhatsApp. The activity reportedly came from, or was amplified by, accounts linked to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, France and the United States. Some WhatsApp groups were reportedly administered through telephone numbers with Algerian country codes.

Gil estimates that the campaign generated more than 11 million potential digital impressions. This figure combines video views, group members, posts, comments and other interactions. It does not mean that 11 million different people participated in or were influenced by the campaign.

The analysis is not an official Spanish intelligence report. It was produced by a private analyst, and the publicly available material is insufficient to verify the entire dataset independently. The report does not identify a central organiser or determine who initiated, financed or directed the mobilisation. Atalayar has published a detailed account of the findings and their limitations.

The firm conclusion is that a large and decentralised digital mobilisation took place. Who initiated, funded or deliberately amplified it remains unknown.

What did Morocco do?

Moroccan authorities blame the events on disinformation, human-trafficking networks and a deliberate misinterpretation of the Spanish Supreme Court ruling. At the same time, Rabat describes Morocco as a reliable partner in the fight against irregular migration.

That explanation may account for the digital mobilisation, but it does not fully explain what physically happened at the border.

Reuters has cited reports by El País and the Cadena SER radio network, based on sources familiar with the conclusions of Spanish intelligence. According to those sources, the Spanish services concluded that Morocco did not plan the initial mobilisation but allowed it to develop and subsequently exploited its political consequences.

The same sources claim that Moroccan border controls were gradually reduced during July and virtually disappeared during the decisive phase, which coincided with Morocco’s Throne Day celebrations.

These are serious claims, but they have not been presented in a public report by Spain’s National Intelligence Centre. They must therefore be described as media reports based on intelligence sources, rather than as conclusively documented facts.

It must also be acknowledged that Moroccan security forces later intervened with water cannons, batons and tear gas. Morocco also cooperated in returning many of those who had crossed.

The picture, therefore, is not of a border that remained open throughout the entire episode. The suspicion is that Moroccan authorities may have permitted a critical window before reasserting control.

Morocco has shown that it can stop such attempts

In September 2024, a similar migration attempt was organised through social media. On that occasion, Morocco established checkpoints, moved potential participants away from the border area and arrested people accused of encouraging irregular migration. The mobilisation was stopped before it developed into a comparable mass crossing. Reuters documented the Moroccan authorities’ operation.

In 2021, another major surge towards Ceuta was linked to a dispute between Madrid and Rabat after Spain allowed Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front, to receive medical treatment on Spanish territory.

Neither precedent proves that Morocco planned the events of July 2026. They do, however, demonstrate that Rabat exercises considerable control over its security apparatus and movement towards the border—and that migration has previously served as an instrument of political pressure.

An American signal that should not be ignored

A report by the US House Appropriations Committee describes Ceuta and Melilla as Spanish-administered cities that “are located in Moroccan territory”. The committee encourages the US secretary of state to promote diplomatic engagement regarding the cities’ future status.

The same section recommends at least $20 million for Morocco through US national security investment programmes and another $20 million in military financing. The wording appears in the committee report accompanying the 2027 appropriations bill.

The House of Representatives passed the related bill, H.R. 8595, in July. However, language in a committee report is not the same as enacted US foreign policy, and the legislative process had not been completed when this article was written.

The document therefore demonstrates that influential sections of Congress support American involvement in the dispute over Ceuta and Melilla. It does not prove that the US government supports a Moroccan takeover or contributed to the border events.

An even more explicit proposal came from Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon official now affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute. In March, Rubin urged Morocco to organise a new “Green March” into Ceuta and Melilla.

He wrote that Moroccans should gather, send bulldozers to the border and enter the two cities unarmed to raise the Moroccan flag. Rubin’s article remains publicly available.

Rubin does not speak on behalf of the US government. His article does, however, demonstrate that the idea of a mass civilian mobilisation against the two Spanish cities had been formulated and recommended within an American security-policy environment several months before the events.

The Israeli connection

In April, Moroccan analyst Amine Ayoub, who is affiliated with the Middle East Forum, published a commentary in the Israeli newspaper Ynet entitled “How Israel Can Help Morocco Reclaim Its North”.

Ayoub argued that the dispute between the United States and Spain created a strategic opportunity for Morocco and that Israel could support Rabat diplomatically and through its connections in Washington. He presented closer cooperation between the United States, Israel and Morocco as a way to weaken Spain’s position and advance Moroccan claims to Ceuta and Melilla. The commentary is available from Ynet.

This was an opinion article written by a Moroccan analyst. It was not an Israeli government document. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that cooperation between the three countries to increase pressure on Spain has been discussed publicly.

Military and security cooperation between Israel and Morocco is real. The two countries signed a new joint military work plan in January 2026. They have also maintained a cybersecurity agreement since 2021, involving research, information sharing and operational cooperation. The military plan was confirmed by the Israel Defense Forces, while the cybersecurity agreement was announced in 2021.

Israel and the United States both have serious disputes with Spain

Relations between Spain and Israel are at a historic low. Spain has recognised the State of Palestine, strengthened its arms embargo, prohibited ships and aircraft carrying weapons to Israel from using Spanish ports and airspace, and permanently withdrawn its ambassador.

At the same time, relations between the government of Pedro Sánchez and President Donald Trump have deteriorated sharply. The dispute concerns, among other issues, Spain’s defence spending and its refusal to support US and Israeli military operations against Iran.

In July, Trump ordered a halt to trade with Spain, although the measure’s practical and legal implementation remained unclear. Reuters described the dispute on 8 July.

After the border crossing, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, used the situation to attack Spain and question its control over “colonial enclaves” in Africa. Spain’s transport minister, Óscar Puente, responded that “everything is beginning to become quite clear”.

Danon’s intervention shows that a senior Israeli representative sought to exploit the crisis politically. It does not prove that he or the Israeli government had prior knowledge of the events.

Pegasus does not establish a connection to Ceuta

The phones of Pedro Sánchez and several Spanish ministers were previously infected with the Israeli-made Pegasusspyware. The Spanish investigation was closed in January 2026 because Israeli authorities did not respond to the court’s requests for information.

The investigation did not identify who was responsible for the surveillance. Moroccan intelligence has been suspected in separate Pegasus investigations, but it has not been publicly established that Morocco was behind the attacks on members of the Spanish government. Nor is there any documented connection between Pegasus and the events in Ceuta. Reuters’ report makes clear that no suspect was identified.

The Pegasus case may provide background illustrating the lack of transparency and the existence of extensive security cooperation. It cannot be used as evidence of a joint operation against Ceuta.

Conclusion: The motive is documented—the possible involvement must be investigated

There is currently no public evidence showing that US or Israeli authorities organised the digital campaign or helped Morocco open the border.

That does not mean the question should be dismissed.

Morocco had the clearest motive, the necessary instruments and control over the physical border. It claims sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, has previously used migration as an instrument of pressure, and has demonstrated that it can stop similar mobilisations when its authorities choose to do so.

In the United States, there is both a congressional document challenging Spain’s position and commentary from security-policy circles directly recommending a mass civilian mobilisation against Ceuta and Melilla. In Israel, similar pressure against Spain has been presented as strategically beneficial.

Both countries are engaged in serious disputes with the Sánchez government, while Israel and Morocco continue to expand their military and security cooperation.

There is therefore a documented alignment of interests: Morocco could strengthen its territorial claims, Israel could strike at one of its most outspoken European critics, and the Trump administration could increase pressure on a Spanish government with which it is already in open conflict.

That is sufficient to make possible American or Israeli involvement a legitimate journalistic working hypothesis. It is not sufficient to present such involvement as established fact.

A genuine investigation must obtain data identifying who created and financed the digital networks, who administered the WhatsApp groups, what orders Moroccan border guards received, and whether relevant information was exchanged between Morocco, Israel and US actors.

The preliminary conclusion must therefore contain two parts: Morocco appears to have permitted and politically exploited the events, if the reports based on Spanish intelligence sources are correct. The United States and Israel had documented motives for supporting such pressure against Spain. But the claim that they actually contributed has not yet been proven. That is precisely why this connection must be investigated rather than dismissed.